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Abstract
Although the UN narcotic drugs conventions do not allow states parties to legalize 
cannabis cultivation and trade for recreational use, there are possibilities for states 
to do so anyhow while staying within the boundaries of international public law. A 
first option concerns positive human rights obligations, i.e. obligations that require 
states to take measures in order to offer the best protection of human rights. If a state 
convincingly argues that with cannabis regulation positive human rights obligations 
to protect society can be more effectively achieved than under a prohibitive approach, 
the priority position of human rights obligations over the drugs conventions can jus-
tify such regulation. The second option regards the modification of the drugs conven-
tions through an inter se agreement on cannabis regulation between certain of the 
states parties only. The positive human rights approach and the inter se possibility can 
strengthen each other and are a supreme combination. 
*   Prof. Dr. P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen is also Secretary General of the International Penal and 
Penitentiary Foundation (ippf).
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1 Introduction
Within different contexts and for varied reasons, an increasing number of ju-
risdictions are considering or have already adopted the regulation – through 
legalization, decriminalization or policy based tolerance – of cannabis culti-
vation and trade for the recreational user market.1 The United Nations (UN) 
narcotic drug conventions – particularly: the UN 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs2 as amended by the 1972 Protocol3 and the 1988 UN Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances4, 5 – 
oppose such developments. The drug control system is concerned with the 
“health and welfare of mankind” and of “human beings”6 and has two funda-
mental concrete goals. It aims to ensure that narcotic drugs are available for 
medical use and for scientific purposes.7 At the same time, it aims to guarantee 
that the use of narcotic drugs is exclusively restricted to those medical and 
scientific purposes.8 As far as the circulation of narcotic drugs for non-medical 
1   See incb, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2017 (United Nations, 
2018) pp. 35–36, 67–68 and 72–74, naming the Bahamas, Canada, Colombia, Jamaica, the 
Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Uruguay and the USA, and pp. 59, 78 and 
103, where general remarks are made about South America and Europe (incb annual reports 
are further referred to as: incb Report [year]). These and other countries are also discussed 
in Martin Jelsma, Neil Boister, David Bewley-Taylor, Malgosia Fitzmaurice & John Walsh, 
Balancing Treaty Stability and Change: Inter se modification of the UN drug control conventions 
to facilitate cannabis regulation (gdpo Policy Report 7, March 2018) pp. 1–43 at 3–6.
2   United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs New York, 30 March 1961, 520 unts 151, 
in force 13 December 1964.
3   Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Geneva, 25 March 1972, 976 
unts 3, in force 8 August 1975.
4   UN, Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 
20 December 1988, 1582 unts 95, in force 11 November 1990.
5   Of only secondary importance to the cannabis discussion is a third convention, i.e. the 1971 
UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 21 February 1971, 1019 unts 175, in force 
16 August 1976.
6   See Preambles to the Single Convention (supranote 3) and the Illicit Traffic Convention 
(supranote 4), respectively.
7   See Preamble to the Single Convention.
8   See also United Nations, Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (New 
York: 1973) p. 110.
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and non-scientific purposes is concerned, it seems hard to argue that the ob-
ject and purpose of the conventions is not to ban such circulation completely.9 
In the light of this goal and from the internal perspective of the multi-layered 
system of obligations in the UN narcotic drugs conventions, there is no legal 
room for any form of regulated permission of the cultivation or trade of can-
nabis with a view to supplying the recreational user market.10 However, this 
does not necessarily mean that it is impossible for states to permit cannabis 
cultivation and trade through regulated legalization of cannabis in national 
law within the boundaries of international public law. This article discusses 
two possibilities for states that can mutually reinforce each other. 
The first option concerns positive human rights obligations, i.e. obligations 
that require states to take measures in order to guarantee fundamental human 
rights of individuals. Regulated permission of cannabis cultivation and trade 
may offer better possibilities for states to protect human rights interests than a 
prohibitive approach. Section 2 therefore explains how states – on the basis of 
their positive human rights obligations that follow from the right to health, the 
right to life, the right to physical and psychological integrity (the right not to 
be subjected to inhuman treatment) and the right to privacy – can be obligated 
to permit, under regulation, cannabis cultivation and trade for recreational use 
if such regulation ensures a better protection of these rights than a prohibi-
tive drug policy as prescribed by the drugs conventions. With this in mind, in 
section 3 we discuss whether states can or must prioritize their obligations 
under international human rights law over their obligations under the drugs 
conventions. It concludes that where these regimes interfere, positive human 
rights obligations have priority. The article then goes on to discuss the second 
option: section 4 evaluates the possibility of inter se modification of the UN 
narcotic drugs conventions within the conditions set out in Article 41 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (vclt). In doing so, we will argue 
that the positive human rights approach and inter se modification can be of 
value to each other in legalizing cannabis cultivation and trade for recreational 
use within the framework of international public law. 
9    For an elaborate exposition, see P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen & M.I. Fedorova, International 
Law and Cannabis I. Regulation of Cannabis Cultivation for Recreational Use under the UN 
Narcotic Drugs Conventions and the EU Legal Instruments in Anti-Drugs Policy (forthcom-
ing 2018).
10   See also for example Krzysztof Krajewski, “How flexible are the United Nations drug 
conventions?”, 10 International Journal of Drug Policy (1999) pp. 329–338 at 329; David R. 
Bewley-Taylor, “The Contemporary International Drug Control System: A History of the 
UNGASS Decade”, in John Collins (ed.), Governing the Global Drug Wars (2012) pp. 49–55 
at 50.
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2 International Positive Human Rights Obligations as a Basis for 
Regulating Cannabis 
Arguments underlying pleas for regulated legalization of cannabis cultiva-
tion and trade for recreational use often relate to the interests of individual 
and public health, the safety of individuals and crime control. The essence 
of these arguments is that regulation of the recreational cannabis market 
can better protect these interests than a prohibitive and repressive approach. 
Interestingly, the umbrella of human rights also covers interests of health, 
safety and crime control. The right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health, the right to life, the right to physical and psycho-
logical integrity and the right to privacy are the source of the so-called posi-
tive human rights obligations for the fulfilment of the stated interests. Positive 
obligations require states to intervene actively rather than to refrain from act-
ing, as is the case with negative obligations. Positive human rights obligations 
thus legally require states to take measures in order to protect fundamental 
human rights.
In this section we will highlight how, within which limits and under what 
conditions the regulated legalization of cannabis can indeed be considered 
a positive human rights obligation.11 The findings are primarily based on the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (icescr)12 
and the jurisprudence of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (cescr); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights13 
(iccpr) and the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (hrc); and 
the opinions and commentaries of other specialized UN authorities, such 
as the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health. In addition, the (Revised) 
European Social Charter (esc),14 as well as the considerations about it of 
the European Committee of Social Rights (ecsr) and the European Convention 
11   See for a comprehensive analysis of relevant international human rights provisions, case 
law, official reports and memoranda as well as literature, from which the following is 
derived, chapter 2 in P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen & M.I. Fedorova, International Law and 
Cannabis II. Regulation of Cannabis Cultivation and Trade for Recreational Use: Positive 
Human Rights Obligations versus UN Narcotic Drugs Conventions (forthcoming 2018).
12   UN, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York) 
16 December 1966, 993 unts 3, in force 3 January 1976.
13   UN, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York) 16 December 1966, 999 
unts 171, in force 23 March 1976.
14   Original European Social Charter: Turin, 18 October 1961, 529 unts 89, ets 35; Revised 
esc: Strasbourg, 3 May 1996, ets 163.
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on Human Rights15 (echr) and the corresponding case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have been analysed. 
2.1 Examples of Pro-regulation Arguments that are Potentially Relevant 
to Positive Human Rights Obligations
For the applicability of positive human rights obligations, it is required that the 
regulation of cannabis cultivation and trade should protect interests that are 
relevant from the perspective of human rights. Before explaining this rel-
evance, it is important to underline that we do not question or assess the 
empirical validity of all of these arguments. We conduct a legal analysis on 
the basis of the hypothesis that all these arguments are valid on their merits 
and thus only assess whether there is room for regulation if these arguments 
were to be valid. 
One interest that is at the core of many arguments in favour of cannabis 
regulation is that such regulation would positively affect individual and public 
health.16 In international law, the concept of ‘health’ is a broadly interpreted, 
multi-dimensional construction containing both biophysical and psychologi-
cal elements. The right to health and the obligations that arise from it for states 
are not limited to health care as such, but incorporate all factors that affect the 
health of individuals and the public at large.17 A policy on drugs or cannabis 
can therefore be important to the concept of ‘health’ in the right to health. 
The most elaborate general provision on this right is Article 12 icescr, which 
guarantees “the rights of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attain-
able standard of physical and mental health.” From this ambitious and result- 
oriented wording it follows that states are obliged to choose policies and 
other measures that they can effectively implement, taking into account avail-
able resources, and that best guarantee the right to health of individuals and 
society.18 This obligation imposes a need to continuingly strive for a higher 
level of protection and is by nature boundless in this respect. 
15   EU, European Convention on Human Rights (Rome) 4 November 1950, 213 unts 221, 312 
ets 5.
16   UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Study on the impact of the world drug prob-
lem on the enjoyment of human rights (A/HRC/30/65, 2015) para 24–30; see also the 
extensive overview in Joanne Csete et al., “Public health and international drug policy”, 
387 The Lancet 10026 (2016) pp. 1427–1480.
17   E.g. cescr, General Comment No. 14 (2000): ‘Right to Health’ (E/C.12/2000/4), para 4, 9, 
10, 11; ecsr, Digest of the Case Law of the European Committee of Social Rights (Council of 
Europe, 2008) pp. 81–88.
18   Cf. Article 2 icescr.
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Within the scope of the right to health a plethora of all sorts of obligations 
arises.19 Next to negative obligations to respect individuals’ control over their 
own body and health, there are numerous positive obligations, including regu-
lation and policies, budget availability, promotional activities, implementa-
tion of monitoring measures, identifying the health indicators and criteria, 
and measures that enable individuals and communities to realize their right 
to health.20 It follows that regulation of cannabis for recreational use is within 
the sphere of influence of the right to health in Article 12 icescr and Article 11 
esc. Moreover, the broad scope of obligations ensuing from the right to health, 
as interpreted by the cescr and the ecsr, means that the arguments present-
ed in favour of cannabis regulation and that relate to individual and public 
health – assuming their validity – are all in principle relevant for these obli-
gations under the right to health. This relates to arguments that defend that 
through regulation authorities would better be able to, for example, safeguard 
the quality of cannabis; monitor the quality of the cannabis chain in general; 
protect the health of juveniles through a stricter control on the ban of juvenile 
cannabis consumption; protect the health of residents who suffer from nega-
tive consequences of home cultivation and illegal nurseries, which include a 
direct risk of seriously harmful infections (such as Legionella), unsafe wiring of 
the electrical installations and the ensuing risk of fire; separate the soft drugs 
and hard drugs markets and thus prevent users to slide down the slippery slope 
towards hard drugs; and on balance increase public health through regulated 
availability of cannabis as a less risky alternative stimulant as compared to 
alcohol or tobacco.21
Although more nuanced, a similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to 
many of the arguments that relate to the protection of the life, physical and 
mental integrity and privacy of individuals. Arguments related to reduction of 
peripheral crime as well as the protection of the health and lives of individuals 
from murder, manslaughter, death by negligence due to, for example, hemp 
nursery fires and/or harmful infections, and the prevention of overdoses or the 
contraction of fatal diseases resulting from the use of hard drugs – by separat-
ing the soft drugs and hard drugs markets – are all relevant from the perspec-
tive of the positive obligation to protect the right to life (Articles 6 iccpr and 
19   cescr General Comment No. 14, supra note 17, para 1; ecsr Digest, supra note 17, 
pp. 81–88. 
20   Ibid, para 9, 36; ecsr Digest, supra note 17, p. 84.
21   See for the inventory of arguments the several sources mentioned in for example supra 
note 1 and 9.
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2 echr22). For the obligations ensuing from the right to physical and mental 
integrity (Articles 7 ICCPR and 3 echr23), arguments related to reducing pe-
ripheral crimes, such as grievous bodily harm and severe burns and severely 
harmful infections, are relevant. For the right to privacy (Articles 17 iccpr 
and 8 echr24), it is relevant that regulation of cannabis is assumed to lead 
to reduction of peripheral crime (assault and threats) and protection of the 
residents’ environment through reduction of substantial nuisance and damage 
(such as caused by serious levels of stench, noise, flooding, fire and harmful 
infection), if there is a substantial and fairly direct limitation of the enjoyment 
of one’s private life.
The finding that arguments pro regulation of cannabis cultivation and trade 
for recreational use are relevant from the perspective of human rights is only 
the first step towards the applicability of positive human rights obligations – the 
second step is taken next.
2.2 Regulated Legalization as a Positive Human Rights Obligation
None of the aforementioned human rights instruments – i.e. the icescr, esc, 
iccpr and echr – do resist regulated permission of the cultivation of and 
trade in cannabis for recreational use by adults.25 That is, if and insofar as that 
drug policy de facto guaranteed individual and public health and the protec-
tion against violations of life, physical and psychological integrity and privacy 
better than a more prohibitive drug policy. The Human Rights Committee 
even explicitly advocates a drug policy based on individual and public health 
22   See e.g. hrc, General Comment No. 6 (1982): “Right to Life” (HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, Vol. i) 
paras 3–5, and more elaborately, with many references, hrc, General comment No. 36: 
“Article 6 iccpr on the right to life”, Revised draft prepared by the Rapporteur (CCPR/C/
GC/R.36/Rev.7, 2017) paras 4 and 22–35 (especially 30); see for the echr e.g. Osman/
The UK, ECtHR (GC) 28 October 1998, no. 23452/94, paras 115–116; Brincat/Malta, ECtHR 
24 July 2014, no. 60908/11, paras 103–117; Ciechońska/Poland, ECtHR 16 June 2011, 
no. 19776/04, paras 59–67; A.E.M. Leijten, Core Rights and the Protection of Socio-Economic 
Interests by the European Court of Human Rights (2015) pp. 351–359.
23   See e.g. hrc, General Comment No. 20 (1992): “Prohibition of torture and inhuman treat-
ment” (HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, Vol. I) para. 2; D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E.P. Bates & C.M. Buckley 
(eds.), Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2014) 
pp. 274–277.
24   See e.g. hrc, General Comment No. 16 (1988): “Right to privacy” (HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, 
Vol. i) para. 1; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu/Romania, ECtHR 26 July 2011, no. 9718/03, 
para 48–49, and with further references Harris, O’Boyle, Bates & Buckley, supra note 23, 
pp. 523, 532–536.
25   This is, however, different as regards juveniles; see ecsr Digest, supra note 17, p. 97. See 
also Article 33 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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and rejects a “zero tolerance” drug policy.26 Even though states are required to 
discourage the use, production and marketing of substances such as narcotic 
drugs,27 this does not necessarily have to take place through prohibition or 
repression. 
The core question is therefore whether a drug policy that permits the culti-
vation of and trade in cannabis for recreational use is an acceptable and pos-
sibly even required vehicle for implementing the right to health, the right to 
life, the right to physical and psychological integrity (the right not to be sub-
jected to inhuman treatment) and/or the right to privacy, if and insofar as that 
drug policy de facto guaranteed the protection of these rights better than a 
more prohibitive drug policy? In answer to this question, two alternative legal 
scenarios need to be assessed.28 The first is that a state not only may regulate 
cannabis for recreational use, but indeed must do so pursuant to its positive 
human rights obligations under these rights (may and must). The second is 
that a state may and can implement the positive human rights obligations 
under these rights by regulating cannabis for recreational use, but is in fact 
not obliged to do so (may, can, not obliged). An important condition with 
both scenarios is that cannabis regulation protects the discussed human rights 
interests better than a prohibitive drug policy.
In relation to the right to health, we find the first scenario (may and must) 
the best defensible option, in principle. A crucial fundament to this conclusion 
is that under this right, states are obliged to use “all appropriate means” with 
which they can fully realize “the highest attainable standard of health”.29 The 
obligation to implement the right to health is unlimited in the sense (1) that 
it has no ceiling (full realization of the highest attainable standard) and 
(2) that all measures that contribute to realizing the convention rights must be 
deployed if that is actually possible for the state (all appropriate means). This 
obligation to achieve results follows explicitly from Article 12 icescr as well 
as the case law of the cescr and the ecsr.30 States have “a specific and con-
tinuing obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards 
26   hrc, Concluding Observations (Georgia) (ccpr C/GEO/CO/4, 2014) under C.
27   See cescr General Comment No. 14, supra note 17, para 9, 15, 36, 51; ecsr Digest, supra 
note 17, p. 84. See also, e.g., Ben Saul, David Kinley & Jacqueline Mowbray, The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2014) p. 1031, 1060–1061.
28   For a much more elaborate analysis, see sections 2.3.12(ii) in Van Kempen & Fedorova 
(2018 II), supra note 11.
29   Article 12 in combination with Article 2 icescr.
30   See e.g. cescr General Comment No. 14, supra note 17, para 1, 33; ecsr, Conclusions 
2013 on the esc (The Netherlands) (2014) under: Article 11; International Federation of 
Human Rights Leagues (FIDH)/Greece, ecsr 23 January 2013, no 72/2011, para 144. See also 
ecsr Digest, supra note 17, p. 81. For more general characterisation of obligations ensuing 
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the full realization” of the right to health.31 To achieve the highest attainable 
standard of health, states must take all reasonable and effective measures that 
are at their disposal.32 Relevant new knowledge and developing insights may 
play a role in this. Importantly, a state is primarily responsible for consider-
ing which measures or steps, given the specific circumstances in the state, are 
the most appropriate so as to fulfil its human rights obligations (principle of 
primarity).33 This applies to all human rights obligations, including the obliga-
tion to achieve progressively the full realization of the right to health.34 If a 
state in accordance with the requirement of “pacta sunt servanda”35 genuinely 
believes and demonstrates that regulated permission of the cultivation of and 
trade in cannabis for recreational use best protects individual and public health, 
that state therefore meets its obligation under the convention to achieve “the 
highest attainable standard” of health by introducing such regulation. People’s 
participation and democratic decision making process – which are relevant 
factors when ascertaining what the ‘most appropriate means’ are for a state 
to take in order to realize the right to health36 – reinforce the assumption that 
the policy of regulation is indeed the most appropriate and effective measure 
that the state is required to take. We conclude that if regulated permission of 
cannabis cultivation and trade for recreational use is the most appropriate and 
from the iccpr, see cescr, General Comment No. 3 (1990): The Nature of States Parties’ 
Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant) (E/1991/23) para 1.
31   cescr General Comment No. 14, supra note 17, para 31.
32   Ibid, para 2, 30–45, 52. See also, among other sources, Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Handbook for 
National Human Rights Institutions (UN/OHCHR, 2005) pp. 10–12; Special Rapporteur on 
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health, Anand Grover, Report A/69/299 (2014) para 3; Saul, Kinley & Mowbray, 
supra note 27, pp. 1041–1049. See also ecsr Digest, supra note 17, p. 15. 
33   This term is coined by Jonas Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and 
Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights (2009) pp. 5–6. 
34   cescr General Comment No. 14, supra note 17, para 42, 53; cescr General Comment 
No. 3, supra note 30, para 4; ecsr, Conclusions XX-3 (2014) on the esc (Denmark), under: 
Article 6; International Federation of Human Rights (fidh)/Belgium, ecsr 18 March 2013, 
no 75/2011, para 54; ecsr Digest, supra note 17, p. 14.
35   See Article 26 vclt: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.” See also Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. 
Slovakia), icj 25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7 at 78–79, para 142; Daniel Davison-
Vecchione, “Beyond the Forms of Faith: Pacta Sunt Servanda and Loyalty”, 16 German Law 
Journal 5 (2015) pp. 1163–1190 at 1166.
36   cescr General Comment No. 14, supra note 17, para 11, 17 and 54; Marangopoulos 
Foundation for Human Rights (mfhr)/Greece, ecsr 6 December 2006, no 30/2005, para 
205 and 216. See also Special Rapporteur on health, Anand Grover, supra note 32, para 3; 
John Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law (2012) p. 111.
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effective measure to safeguard the highest attainable standard of individual 
and public health in a country, it can be seen as an obligation arising from the 
right to health to adopt such regulation, provided a number of criteria that we 
will discuss later are met. 
Also in relation to the rights to life, physical and psychological integrity and 
privacy we ultimately conclude that the first scenario (may and must) can in 
principle be best defended, although this is less straightforward than with re-
gard to the right to health. The reason for this is that states do not have an ob-
ligation with the rights in the iccpr and the echr to achieve “full realization”, 
only an obligation to “respect and to ensure” or “secure” these rights, to protect 
them effectively at the level and in the manner required by the hrc and the 
ECtHR. To that end, the states parties are required to take (all) measures that 
are “necessary” and “appropriate” to achieve the required level of protection.37 
If regulated legalization of cannabis for recreational use is an effective poli-
cy with which this level of protection can be best achieved, this policy could 
qualify in principle as an appropriate measure and thus fall within the scope of 
positive human rights obligations under the discussed rights. Yet, the question 
remains whether a state must implement such a policy. Given the margin of 
appreciation that states have in the implementation of ‘appropriate’ measures, 
the answer depends on one’s perspective on the interpretation of state obliga-
tion. Again, two approaches can be defended. In both cases, the assumption 
applies that the state, in accordance with its primary responsibility to decide 
which measures are most appropriate to fulfil the positive obligation of protec-
tion, taking into account the specific circumstances in the state (the principle 
of primarity), draws the conclusion, in good faith (“pacta sunt servanda”) and 
with sufficient substantiation, that regulated permission of cannabis for recre-
ational use is the best way to fulfil the positive obligations of protection of the 
rights regarding life, physical and psychological integrity and privacy. 
The first perspective assumes that states are only obliged to take appropri-
ate measures within a certain “margin of appreciation” (discretionary space).38 
The scope of the human rights obligation is thus determined by this margin of 
appreciation. Within the margin, the state can choose one of the possible ap-
proaches (‘appropriate steps’) that fulfils the positive obligation of protection, 
37   See Articles 2 icescr and 1 echr. See also hrc, General Comment No. 31 (2004): ‘General 
Legal Obligation’ (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13) para 14; Sargsyan/Azerbaijan, ECtHR (GC) 16 
June 2015, no 40167/06, para 129; Assanidze/Georgia, ECtHR (GC) 8 April 2004, no 71503/01, 
para 147.
38   On the margin of appreciation, see with further references e.g. Andrew Legg, The Margin 
of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law. Deference and Proportionality (2012) 
pp. 5–6; Harris, O’Boyle, Bates & Buckley, supra note 23, pp. 14–17.
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but it is not required to implement a certain approach. So if, for example, 
the margin leaves room for approach A (preventing 100 unlawful convention 
breaches) and for approach B (preventing 75 unlawful breaches), from this per-
spective the state is not required to choose the more effective A over the less 
effective B. With this first perspective, it can be argued that regulated permis-
sion of cannabis cannot qualify as a positive obligation, not even if this were 
the most effective way to fulfil the obligation of protection, since the state 
would within its margin of appreciation still be completely free to opt for the 
less effective prohibitive approach. 
The second perspective emphasizes that the state is required to take those 
appropriate measures that actually fulfil the positive obligation of protection 
most effectively (approach A above). With this perspective, the margin of 
appreciation does not determine the scope of the obligation but functions as 
an instrument to get states to implement the most effective measures, given 
the particular – social, moral, political, economic etc. – constellation of that 
state. This gives states a certain freedom to escape – when motivated – from 
implementing measures that are experienced as unattractive or impossible 
given the state’s constellation. States act in perfect accordance with this per-
spective if they adopt measures that are the most effective for them on the 
basis that they are required to. This means that regulated permission of canna-
bis cultivation and trade can qualify as a positive obligation, if this permission 
can contribute to the realization of the rights to life, physical and psychologi-
cal integrity and/or privacy more effectively than a prohibition. That a state 
under its ‘margin of appreciation’ could nevertheless argue that it, considering 
its constellation, has reasons to opt for a less effective approach does not affect 
this observation in any way. 
Although the first perspective is probably closer to the way positive obli-
gations and the “margin of appreciation” function in practice, we believe 
that the second perspective can be defended best within the framework of 
the human rights conventions. Four arguments are relevant to this. First, the 
‘object and purpose’ of these conventions is to protect human rights effectively. 
Unqualified freedom for states to settle for less effective approaches than they 
could realize (approach B over A in the above example) does not fit this ‘ob-
ject and purpose’. Secondly, the jurisprudence of both the hrc and the ECtHR 
shows that states must take all necessary or appropriate measures so as to se-
cure and protect the convention rights.39 One may wonder whether measures 
that are less effective in preventing unlawful breaches of convention rights still 
qualify as “appropriate” on essentially the same basis as achievable and more 
39   See supra note 37. 
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effective measures. Thirdly, the first perspective ignores the rationale and pur-
pose of the “margin of appreciation”. With positive obligations, it is primarily 
aimed at being able to determine what – in the light of the constellation of 
the state – the “appropriate steps” are to meet the obligation to secure conven-
tion rights. Even if a state adopts less than optimal measures and in doing so 
remains within the margin, this is still only allowed to the extent that the state 
presents compelling reasons for doing so.40 Finally, in accordance with the 
principle of primarity, the state has the primary responsibility to decide which 
measures are most appropriate to fulfil the positive human rights obligations 
taking into account the specific circumstances of that state. This implies that 
if a state in accordance with the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” genuinely 
believes and convincingly argues that regulated legalization of the cultivation 
of and trade in cannabis for recreational use is the best way to guarantee the 
health and safety of individuals and to prevent crime, that state therefore in 
implementing that policy first and foremost meets the obligation to secure the 
convention rights (of course: in as far as these rights cover these interests). 
If such regulation has the support of a large part of society and comes about 
after democratic decision-making, it reinforces the assumption that this policy 
and those measures are indeed the appropriate steps that the authorities must 
take. 
2.3 Positive Human Rights Obligations Presume a Framework of Five 
Cumulative Conditions
The above exploration implies five primary conditions that positive human 
rights obligations impose on regulated legalization – or any other form of regu-
lated permission – of cannabis cultivation and trade for recreational use.
1. Regulated legalization should protect interests that are relevant from 
the perspective of positive human rights obligations (requirement of rel-
evance). Otherwise, the potential applicability of such obligations is out 
of the question. 
2. Next to relevance, the requirement of substantiated greater effectiveness 
must be fulfilled in order for the relevant positive human rights obliga-
tions to be applicable. To this end, the state should substantiate that the 
regulation of cannabis cultivation and trade for recreational use provides 
for a more effective protection of human rights than a prohibitive policy 
40   See e.g. Söderman/Sweden, ECtHR (GC) 12 November 2013, no 5786/08, para 78–117 (the 
state’s arguments do not convince the Court); Kotov/Russia, ECtHR (GC) 3 April 2012, 
no 54522/00, para 131 (the State’s justification is one of the factors to lead the Court to 
assume that there is no infringement of positive obligations).
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that is prescribed by the drugs conventions. Without this greater effec-
tiveness, no obligation under human rights law can arise. The substan-
tiation of this greater effectiveness should in turn be based on genuine 
analysis, argumentation and considerations that are convincing and that 
are, as far as possible, based on available scientific and other research 
data.
3. Regulated legalization must be based on people’s participation and 
democratic-decision making. With that the state will be able to ascer-
tain what the most effective available means for the best realization of 
its positive human rights obligations are in accordance with the so-called 
principle of primarity. Because every society has its own constellation 
and idiosyncrasies, the most effective approach in one state does not nec-
essarily work in another state. This means that if regulated permission 
of cannabis cultivation and trade for a certain state would qualify as an 
obligation under the discussed rights, this does not automatically apply 
to other states as well. 
4. When a state proceeds with regulation of cannabis cultivation and trade, 
it must respect human rights protection in other states and the primary 
responsibility of these other states to decide on the best policy within 
their jurisdictions. The regulating state should thus make sure to enforce 
its regulation to such a degree that other states are not confronted with 
negative consequences, most importantly with the illegal export from 
the regulating state. The protection offered in that sense to other states 
should not be less – and preferably even more effective – than that of-
fered under the prohibitive approach that fully accords with the UN drugs 
control system. Therefore, the state should create a closed system and/or 
chain for cultivation, trade and possibly also use of cannabis within the 
state or between like-minded states.
5. In case of legalization, a state should create a policy of discouragement, 
limitation and increased public awareness of the risks associated with 
recreational use of cannabis.41 This is necessary not only to ensure that 
the national drugs policy adequately protects human rights; the right to 
health itself creates an obligation to that end. When developing such a 
policy of discouragement, the state needs to consider what measures are 
most effective. 
41   See supra note 28.
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3 Priority of Positive Human Rights Obligations over UN Narcotic 
Drug Convention Obligations
It follows that there is a strong, and indeed the strongest, case to be made for 
regulated permission of cannabis to qualify as a positive human rights obliga-
tion under certain conditions. When this is the case, the state’s human rights 
obligations interfere with its obligations under the drugs conventions. On 
the basis of our analysis of particularly the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (vclt),42 the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter),43 the case 
law of the International Court of Justice (icj), the work of the International 
Law Commission (ilc) and the pertinent relevant commentaries and litera-
ture, we conclude that in case of such interference positive human rights ob-
ligations can provide national governments with sufficient room under public 
international law to derogate from the UN drug control system.44 The main 
arguments on which we base our conclusion that positive human rights obliga-
tions have priority over the drug conventions obligations are presented below. 
Notably, none of these arguments is by itself indispensable for this conclusion, 
which would still hold if one or several of these arguments fell by the wayside.
3.1 Formal Priority Position of Positive Human Rights Obligations
Although the classic rules about determining precedence – that is the lex 
specialis rule (speciality), the lex posterior and prior rules (temporality) and the 
lex superior rule (the importance of the interest at stake) – have only limited 
value when resolving the interference between human rights and drugs con-
ventions obligations, there are several important arguments that support the 
position of formal priority of human rights obligations. 
While establishing the “same subject matter” proves to be an important 
obstacle to the applicability of Article 30 vclt, an analogous application of 
this provision to the cannabis issue supports the prevalence of human rights 
conventions over the drug control conventions. In this respect, it is relevant 
that Article 14(2) of the Illicit Traffic Convention explicitly states that mea-
sures against illicit cannabis cultivation “shall respect fundamental human 
rights”. Moreover, the preparatory work for both the Single Convention and 
the Illicit Traffic Convention contains several references to human rights that 
42   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna) 23 May, 1969, 1155 unts 331, in force 
27 January 1980.
43   Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945, 1 unts xvi, in force 24 October 
1945.
44   See for a much more comprehensive analysis, from which the following is derived, 
chapter 3 in Van Kempen & Fedorova (2018 ii), supra note 11.
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implicitly or explicitly suggest state’s awareness of the importance that the 
obligations under the drugs conventions should not violate human rights.45 
Besides, according to the monitoring bodies of the drugs control system, i.e. 
the International Narcotics Control Board (incb) and the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs (cnd), implementation and execution of that system must be 
carried out in accordance with human rights norms and must promote such 
norms.46
The relevance of the lex superior rule to the cannabis issue is also expressed 
by virtue of Article 103 of the UN Charter, which stresses that the obligations 
under the UN Charter prevail over other obligations. Although the exact 
scope of Article 103 is not absolutely clear or without controversy,47 consider-
ing that the concept of “obligations under the Charter” must be interpreted 
rather broadly48 and in the light of the preamble and the text of the many 
Charter provisions referring to human rights,49 the object and purpose of the 
UN Charter and the case law of the International Court of Justice about it,50 
we conclude that those provisions create obligations for the member states, 
to respect and observe human rights.51 Accordingly, pursuant to Article 103 
45   See e.g. United Nations, “Conference for the adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs. New York – 24 January–25 March 1961, Official Records, Volume I” (E/CONF. 34/24) 
pp. 196–197; United Nations, “Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Vienna, 25 November– 
20 December 1988, Official Records, Volume I” (E/CONF. 82/16) pp. 18 (para 101), 25 
(para 200), 26 (para 201) and 34 (para 45).
46   See the references to the incb and the cnd in the next section.
47   See e.g. Rain Liivoja, “The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of The United Nations Charter”, 
57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2008) pp. 583–612 at 584–585; Robert 
Kolb, “Does Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations Apply Only to Decisions or 
Also to Authorizations Adopted by the Security Council?”, 64 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2004) pp. 21–35 at 21.
48   See Rain Liivoja, supra note 47, pp. 588–589; Robert Kolb, supra note 47, pp. 21–35; 
A. Paulus & J.R. Leiß, ‘Article 103’, in B. Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations 
(2012) pp. 2110–2137 at 2116 and 2124–2125, with a reference to case law of the icj.
49   See Article 1(3) on the objectives of the UN and Articles 13(1)(b), 55(c), 56, 62(2), 68 and 
76(c) on the duties of the General Assembly, the member states, ecosoc and the trustee-
ship system.
50   See, e.g. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. 
Iran), icj 24 May 1980, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3 at 42 (para 91); Legal Consequences for States 
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), icj 21 June 1971, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16 at 46 (para 
92) and 57 (para 131).
51   See also H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1968 (1950)) pp. 147–148. Cf. 
e.g. Security Council Resolution 2170 (S/RES/2170, 2014); Security Council Resolution 1456 
(S/RES/1456, 2003).
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UN Charter, those human rights obligations prevail over other obligations 
from other international agreements that conflict with them.52 Whereas 
obligations from the drugs conventions do not fall within the scope of 
Article 103, that is the case for the negative obligations to respect the rights 
regarding health, life, physical and psychological integrity and privacy from 
the udhr, the icescr and the iccpr. It can be argued convincingly that this 
also applies to the positive obligations arising from these rights that may be 
relevant for the regulated permission of cannabis cultivation and trade. The 
International Court of Justice recognizes on several occasions that an interna-
tional instrument is “not static, but […] by definition evolutionary”.53 This then 
also has to apply to the Charter.54 As a result, the meaning of formulations it 
contains also depends on legal and social developments. By now, positive obli-
gations are undeniably part and parcel of positive international human rights 
law, including the iccpr, whether one agrees with it or not.55 In this light, the 
general references in the Charter to ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ 
presently comprise positive obligations as well. That is, if the obligation may 
be assumed to qualify as a solid obligation under a relevant convention, such 
as the icescr or the iccpr. Positive obligations to protect actively interests 
regarding the health and safety of individuals and the prevention of crime 
have been embedded so firmly in the international human rights jurispru-
dence and thereby in the human rights system, that this is indeed the case in 
our view. Those obligations then unconditionally prevail over obligations from 
the drugs conventions pursuant to Article 103 UN Charter. 
52   Special Rapporteurs on globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human 
rights, J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama, Progress report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10, 
2001) para 58; Jordan J. Paust, “Human Rights on the Battlefield”, 47 The George Washington 
International Law Review (2015) pp. 509–561 at 519–520, 530–531; Seung Hwan Choi, 
“‘Human Dignity’ as an Indispensable Requirement for Sustainable Regional Economic 
Integration”, 6 Journal of East Asia and International Law (2013) pp. 81–105 at 87, 90–91; 
Destaw A. Yigzaw, “Hierarchy of Norms: The Case for the Primacy of Human Rights over 
WTO Law”, 38 Suffolk Transnational Law Review (2015) pp. 33–68 at 62–64; E.H. Riedel & 
J.-M. Arend, “Article 55 (c)”, in B. Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations 
(2012) pp. 1565–1602 at 1573. 
53   Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), icj 21 June 1971, I.C.J. 
Reports 1971, p. 16 at 31 (para 53) (on the Covenant of the League of Nations); see also The 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), icj 25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 
1997, p. 7 at 67–68 (para 112).
54   According to A. Peters, ‘Article 25’, in B. Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United 
Nations (2012) pp. 787–854 at 824.
55   For a critical stance on this, see P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen, “Four Concepts of Security – 
A Human Rights Perspective”, 13 Human Rights Law Review (2013) pp. 1–23.
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The esc and the echr do not play a direct part here, for they are not part of 
UN law. Nevertheless, recognition in these instruments of the rights to health, 
life, physical and psychological integrity and privacy supports their univer-
sality. Moreover, it follows from the case law of the ECtHR that human rights 
obligations under the echr have a similar absolute validity and that the echr 
is a relevant factor for the obligation of UN organs to respect human rights.56 
It is plausible that this also applies in principle to the esc, bearing in mind that 
this convention has the same formal status as the echr.
3.2 Substantive Priority Position of Positive Human Rights Obligations
From a more substantive approach of the lex superior rule – which acts not so 
much as a formal rule of priority but rather as a principle for interpretation 
and consideration – the thing that matters most is that human rights, unlike 
the drugs conventions, have a special status. To be sure, this special status does 
not mean that human rights norms have absolute priority in the sense that 
they are automatically to be given hierarchical precedence beyond the art. 103 
UN Charter priority rule or when they have jus cogens status. Rather, they have 
a special weight on the basis of substantive criteria in relation to other inter-
national norms, which has to be taken into account when interpreting these 
norms or resolving conflicts between them.
The special weight of human rights is firstly reflected in the rationale and 
the main purposes of the principal public international law organizations, such 
as the UN and the Council of Europe (CoE).57 In addition, within the system 
of international law, the special position of human rights norms is reflected by 
the fact that human rights mentioned in the udhr (including all four rights 
central to this article) are generally considered to belong to customary law,58 
that human rights are perceived by their nature as erga omnes and ‘integral 
56   Al Jedda/The UK, ECtHR (GC) 7 July 2011, no 27021/08, para 102, confirmed in Nada/
Switzerland, ECtHR (GC) 12 September 2012, no 10593/08, para 171–172.
57   See the Preamble and Articles 1(3), (1)(b), 55(c), 56, 62(2) and 76(c) UN Charter and 
Article 1 CoE Statute.
58   See e.g. L.B. Sohn, “The Human Rights Law of the Charter”, 12 Texas International Law 
Journal (1992) pp. 129–140 at 131–134, and also with further references Riedel & Arend, 
supra note 52, pp. 1578–1579; Richard B. Lillich, “The Growing Importance of Customary 
International Human Rights Law”, 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative 
Law (1995–1996) pp. 1–30. See different Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, “The Sources of 
Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles”, 12 Australian Year Book 
of International Law (1988–1989) pp. 82–108, but they do eventually qualify universal 
human rights as “general principles” of international law (cf. Article 38(1) icj Statute).
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obligations’59 and, admittedly more indirectly, by the fact that most jus cogens 
norms are human rights (although the positive obligations deriving from the 
four relevant rights do not have the status of jus cogens norms in our view). 
Moreover, the special status of human rights can be derived from specific pro-
visions in general agreements as well as from international case law.60 That 
special status extends to positive human rights obligations.61
It is also important that authorities such as the UN General Assembly,62 the 
incb,63 the cnd64 and the Special Rapporteur on the right to health65 as well 
as the Special Rapporteurs on globalization and its impact on the full enjoy-
ment of all human rights66 are all of the opinion that the drugs conventions 
59   See Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium 
v. Spain, Second Phase), icj 5 February 1970, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 3 at 32 (para 33–34), and 
ilc, “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law”, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi (A/CN.4/L/682, 
13 April 2006) paras 385, 391. See also, e.g., Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International 
Obligations Erga Omnes (2000) p. 135; Dinah Shelton, “Hierarchy of Norms and Human 
Rights: Of Trumps and Winners”, 65 Saskatchewan Law Review (2002) pp. 301–331 at 307; 
Catherine Brölmann, “Law-Making Treaties: Form and Function in International Law”, 74 
Nordic Journal of International Law (2005) pp. 383–404; Joost Pauwelyn, “A Typology of 
Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?”, 
14 European Journal of International Law 5 (2003) pp. 907–951 at 933–934 for example; 
M. Craven, “Legal differentiation and the concept of the human rights treaty in interna-
tional law”, 11 European Journal of International Law (2000) pp. 489–519.
60   See e.g. Article 60(5) vclt, Article 21(3) Statute of the International Criminal Court, and 
Article 50(1)(b) ilc Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts. And furthermore: Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi/The UK, ECtHR 2 March 2010, no 61498/08, 
para 127–128; Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc./Switzerland, ECtHR (GC) 21 June 
2016, no 5809/08, para 139–149.
61   See section 3.7.9 in Van Kempen & Fedorova (2018 ii), supra note 11.
62   See e.g. UN General Assembly Resolution 66/183, “International cooperation against the 
world drug problem”, adopted 66th plenary meeting on 19 December 2011 (A/RES/66/183, 
2012) paras 2 and 14(a).
63   incb Report 2017, pp. 44 (no 250) and 45 (no 258), and also e.g. incb Report 2015, p. iv; 
incb Report 2014, p. iii, 1 (nos 1–2) and 8–9 (nos 35–38); the importance of respecting 
human rights was given more prominence for the first time by the incb in incb Report 
2007, p. 2 (no 7), p. 5 (nos 20–21) and p. 9 (nos 37–38).
64   See e.g. cnd Resolution S-30/1 (A/RES/S-30/1, 2016) Annex; cnd Resolution 56/16 
(E/CN.7/2013/14, 2013) preamble; cnd Resolution 58/4 (E/CN.7/2015/15, 2015) preamble.
65   Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health, Anand Grover, Report A/65/255 (2010) para 10.
66   Special Rapporteurs on globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human 
rights, J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama, Progress report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10) 
para 58, and Final report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/14) Annex, para 6.
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may only be implemented with due regard for human rights.67 Insofar as this 
specifically concerns measures to prevent and eradicate, among other things, 
illicit cannabis cultivation, this also follows from Article 14(2) of the Single 
Convention. The Special Rapporteur on the right to health makes it clear that 
in the event of a conflict between human rights obligations and obligations 
under drugs conventions, the former take precedence.68 There is no reason 
to assume that this would not also apply for the positive obligations which 
are relevant to the cannabis issue. On the contrary, these positive obligations 
happen to have found solid recognition under the general human rights con-
ventions and therefore belong to these convention systems, in other words 
‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’.
4 From Positive Human Rights Obligations to inter se Modification of 
the UN Narcotic Drugs Conventions
In case of interference between positive human rights obligations and obliga-
tions arising from the drug control system, the former thus have priority. This 
means that if regulated legalization of cannabis cultivation and trade is genu-
inely based on positive human rights obligations, according to international 
law the drugs conventions system will need to be interpreted and applied in 
such a way that a state can proceed with that regulation. The question is how 
the interference between the human rights and the drug control obligations 
should be dealt with. Several approaches are conceivable. A state could choose 
to legalize cannabis in national law in conformity with its positive human 
rights obligations without changing its formal relation with the UN narcotic 
drugs conventions. It may also opt for legalization after, for instance, denun-
ciation and re-accession with new reservations. However, a more attractive 
alternative from the perspective of international law and international rela-
tions is presented by Boister & Jelsma. They argue that a possible option for 
effecting compatibility of the reform of domestic cannabis laws with the re-
forming state party’s commitments under the UN narcotic drug conventions is 
67   See also, for example, Human Rights Council, “Contribution to the implementation of the 
joint commitment to effectively addressing and countering the world drug problem with 
regard to human rights”, Resolution 37/L.41 (A/HRC/37/L.41, 2018); UN Sub-Commission 
for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, Resolution 1998/12 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1998/12) para 1.
68   Special Rapporteur on health, Anand Grover, supra note 65, para 10.
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the conclusion of inter se69 agreements among like-minded parties permitting 
cannabis cultivation and trade for recreational use.70 
Article 41 of the vclt recognizes the possibility to conclude agreements to 
modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only. According 
to section 1 of this provision, two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty 
may conclude such an agreement if “(a) the possibility of such a modification 
is provided for by the treaty; or (b) the modification in question is not pro-
hibited by the treaty and: (i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other par-
ties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations; 
(ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with 
the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.” 
Since the UN narcotic drugs conventions do neither expressly nor implicitly 
prohibit inter se agreements in general, these are in principle allowed pro-
vided that they meet the conditions of Article 41(1)(b) vclt.71 We assert that 
so called inter se modification would offer the best solution to normalize the 
interference between positive human rights obligations and obligations aris-
ing from the drug control system in case multiple states favour the option to 
regulate cannabis cultivation and trade for recreational use, but amendment 
of the UN narcotic drugs conventions is not a realistic option.
4.1 The Potential Value of inter se Modification for the Positive Human 
Rights Obligations Approach
Whereas positive human rights obligations under international law can pro-
vide room for states to opt for regulated legalization of cannabis cultivation 
and trade, they do not in itself resolve the interference between human rights 
obligations and obligations under the UN narcotic drug conventions.72 This 
means that if a state were to choose to regulate cannabis in national law in 
conformity with its positive human rights obligations without changing its for-
mal relation with the UN narcotic drugs conventions, the interference between 
the different obligations would remain ‘hanging in the air’. This is a less attrac-
tive option from the perspective of several international law principles that are 
discussed below. Inter se modification can function as a suitable instrument 
69   The term inter se means: among or between themselves; see Black’s Law Dictionary (Free 
Online Legal Dictionary, 2nd Ed).
70   See in this journal Neil Boister & Martin Jelsma, “Inter Se Modification of the UN 
Drug Control Conventions: An Exploration of its Applicability to Legitimise the Legal 
Regulation of Cannabis Markets” 20:4–5 International Community Law Review p. 458.
71   Boister & Jelsma, supra note 70, p. 467.
72   Cf. Jelsma, Boister, Bewley-Taylor, Fitzmaurice & Walsh, supra note 1, pp. 1–43 at 1 and 11.
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to resolve the interference in line with the content and purport of these prin-
ciples. It can do so by establishing an international framework within which 
states can effectuate their positive human rights obligations that are relevant 
for the international drugs control system. 
4.1.1 The Importance of Achieving Harmony through Systemic 
Integration 
In the event of interference between international norms, international law 
calls for harmonizing the norms as much as possible.73 Of particular relevance 
in this respect are the presumption against conflict, the presumption of com-
patibility and the principle of systemic integration. The presumption against 
conflict ties in with the idea that states normally do not intend to enter into 
agreements that conflict with other obligations.74 At the heart of the presump-
tion against conflict lies the notion of a coherent and consistent legal system. 
The assumption is that the norms, conventions and subsystems within in-
ternational law are compatible, in other words in harmony with each other. 
That compatibility is not always evident and will need to be achieved through 
interpretation in cases that do not immediately conform to this idea.75 The 
principle of systemic integration comes into play with that interpretation. 
The primacy of the principle of systemic integration stems from the system of 
international law, has a strong foundation in legal practice and international 
case law, and is expressed in Articles 31(1) and 31(3)(c) of the vclt.76
When applying the harmonization approach, several important axioms 
apply. The first basic rule is that the interpretation must take place from within 
current international law. Although the will of the parties at the time of the 
creation of an international instrument is an essential interpretative tool, it is 
necessary to interpret and apply this instrument in the framework of the entire 
73   See elaborately, with further references, sections 3.8 and 3.9 in Van Kempen & Fedorova 
(2018 ii), supra note 11.
74   ilc, “Report 58th Session. Chapter xii. Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation 
of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law” (A/61/10, 2006) p. 414, (para 251(19)); Sarah Joseph, Blame it on the 
WTO?: A Human Rights Critique (2011) p. 47; Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law: How WTO Law relates to Other Rules of International Law (2003) 
pp. 240–241.
75   Cf. Paulus & Leiß, supra note 48, p. 2118.
76   ilc Report Fragmentation (Koskenniemi), supra note 59, paras 410–480. Cf, e.g., 
Al-Adsani/The UK, no 35763/97, ECtHR (GC) 21 November 2001, para 55; Hassan/The UK, 
no 29750/09, ECtHR (GC) 16 September 2014, para 77.
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legal system that is in force at the time of interpretation.77 That is the more so 
if concepts used in the convention are open or evolutionary in character78 or if 
they concern ‘integral’ or ‘normative’ conventions.79 Current international law 
includes at any rate the positive obligations regarding the rights to health, life, 
physical and psychological integrity and private life, all of which are relevant 
to the cannabis issue. Furthermore, the interpretation of law can be partly de-
pendent on for example social, economic and technical developments.80 In 
our opinion, this implies that if there are clear data indicating that obligations 
under the drugs conventions are less effective than is assumed, this must play 
a part in deciding on the content and scope of the drugs conventions pursuant 
to international law. 
A second axiom holds that to arrive at systemic integration, one must look 
for common objectives (“object and purpose”) in the interfering norm systems81 
or whether they seek to protect shared values.82 Thus, an inter se agreement to 
modify the drugs control system relative to cannabis must connect to these 
shared objectives and values. Extensive commonality between the interfering 
regimes can be seen on an abstract level: both the subsystem of human rights 
and that of the drug control system seek to promote the health and welfare 
of mankind and of human beings and acknowledge the primary importance of 
human rights thereto. The incb emphasizes:
77   Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), icj 21 June 1971, I.C.J. 
Reports 1971, p. 16 at 31, para 53. See also Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary v. Slovakia), icj 25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7 at 67–68, para 112; 
Award in the Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (“IJzeren Rijn”) Railway between the 
Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, iaa 24 May 2005, Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards xxvii, pp. 35–125 at 66–67 (para 57–60). See also Campbell 
McLachlan, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention”, 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2005) pp. 279–320 at 282–
284, 316–319.
78   ilc Report Fragmentation (58th Session), supra note 74, pp. 415–416, para 22–23.
79   Brölmann, supra note 59, pp. 393–394.
80   See Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), icj 13 
July 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 213 at 244, para 70–71; ilc Report Fragmentation (58th 
Session), supra note 74, pp. 415–416, para 23.
81   Cf. Article 31(1) vclt. See also ilc Report Fragmentation (Koskenniemi), supra note 59, 
paras 95 and 97.
82   See Ahmad Ali Ghouri, “Determining Hierarchy Between Conflicting Treaties: Are There 
Vertical Rules in the Horizontal System?”, 2 Asian Journal of International Law 2 (2012) 
pp. 235–266.
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The drug control system is a balanced system, driving towards improv-
ing public health and welfare, based on the underlying principles of 
proportionality, collective responsibility and compliance with interna-
tional human rights standards. Implementing this system means putting 
the health and welfare of mankind at the core of drug policies, applying 
comprehensive, integrated and balanced approaches to elaborating drug 
control policy, promoting human rights standards, giving higher priority 
to prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and the reduction of the nega-
tive consequences of drug abuse, and strengthening international coop-
eration based on shared responsibility.83
On a more concrete second level, there is a less perfect commonality between 
purposes, but it is by no means absent. For example, both subsystems require 
discouragement of drug and/or cannabis use and fighting serious drug and/or 
cannabis related crime (by definition, these concern illicit acts taking place out-
side any regulatory framework). On the most concrete third level of purposes, 
the subsystems are diametrically opposed: the UN narcotic drugs conventions’ 
assertion – that follows from its preambles, text, multi-layered framework of 
obligations, system of international cooperation, and preparatory work – that 
the risks of recreational drugs for public health are best combated by a prohibi-
tive and repressive approach, is completely at odds with regulated permission 
of cannabis cultivation and trade because of positive human rights obligations 
to protect individuals’ health, safety and security. The strong and more limited 
commonality on the first and second levels of abstraction can help harmoniz-
ing the strong interference on the third, most concrete level. 
A third and last axiom signifies that an interpretation of the interfering 
norms where both systems retain optimal effect is preferred.84 This is why it is 
important to see how much justice can be done to the obligations under the 
drugs conventions in addition to and under regulated permission of cannabis 
cultivation and trade. 
4.1.2 Inter se Modification in Order to Protect the System of 
International Law
Although it is possible to take the aforementioned principles and axioms into 
consideration in national legislation that regulates cannabis cultivation and 
trade, such legislation will surely not result in the harmonization of the in-
terfering treaty regimes on an international level. To some extent, this also is 
83   incb Report 2015, p. iv. See further supra note 63.
84   See also, with further references, Paulus & Leiß, supra note 48, p. 2118.
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true for late reservations and for new reservations after denunciation and re-
accession, since such solutions will primarily address the individual state only. 
When an appropriate result cannot be achieved through reinterpretation of 
the UN narcotic drug conventions and the amendment of these instruments is 
politically not a realistic option, both of which seem to be the case presently, 
at the international level only inter se modification can offer a somewhat gen-
eral and continuous solution to the interference. Precisely because of the more 
general nature of inter se modification, it moreover offers the best guarantee 
that in a situation of interference between different treaty regimes or obliga-
tions, the quality (i.e., clarity, consistency, coherence and determinativeness), 
the authority (i.e., enforceability and validity) and the legal force (i.e., obligato-
riness and stringency) of the system of international law can be maintained.85 
Through inter se modification, it is possible to design a consensus-driven86 
framework of positive international law within which states have to remain 
when legalizing cannabis. It may thus prevent that individual states blatantly 
ignore their treaty obligations or deal with the interference between treaty ob-
ligations in completely different ways, thereby obscuring the relationship be-
tween the treaty regimes, causing even further fragmentation of international 
law, and undermining legal certainty, the authority and the binding force of 
international law. Furthermore, the possibility for states to become party to an 
inter se agreement should avoid that states feel obliged to formally adhere to 
the UN narcotic drug conventions, while they in practice strongly deviate from 
particular obligations thereunder, as currently is the situation in, for example, 
Canada, the Netherlands, Uruguay and several jurisdictions in the USA.87
4.1.3 Inter se Modification in Order to Protect the UN Drugs Control 
System
In case states are to legalize cannabis in order to give effect to their posi-
tive human rights obligations, inter se modification could be more particu-
larly useful to prevent needless prejudice to the – quality, authority and legal 
force of the – UN narcotic drug conventions. With a view to achieving har-
mony between human rights and the drugs control system through systemic 
85   Cf. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), icj 
30 November 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 639 at 664 (para 66). Cf. also, e.g., Jutta Brunnée & 
Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account 
(2010); Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne–Marie Slaughter 
& Duncan Snidal, “The Concept of Legalization”, 54 International Organization 3 (2000) 
pp. 401–419.
86   Boister & Jelsma, supra note 70, p. 491.
87   See supra note 1.
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integration of the treaty regimes, an inter se agreement could first of all con-
firm the main purposes of the drug control system that do not conflict with 
the legalization of cannabis for reasons of human rights protection. These 
purposes include the health and welfare of mankind, the discouragement of 
narcotic drugs use and the prevention and repression of serious narcotic drugs 
related crime. An inter se agreement could furthermore help to safeguard the 
obligations under these conventions that do not interfere with human rights 
obligations. Indeed, it is possible and therefore necessary to keep the drug con-
trol system fully operational with respect to a number of crucial points.88 First, 
a state’s decision to regulate cannabis cultivation and trade for the recreational 
use must not have more harmful – but preferably more beneficial – effects on 
other countries than a prohibitive policy that is fully compliant with the drugs 
conventions. Secondly, any cannabis cultivation and trade that is not part of 
the regulatory framework will have to be deemed illicit and must therefore be 
combated pursuant to the drug control system, i.e. by criminalization, prose-
cution, administrative prohibitions and seizure. Thirdly, recreational cannabis 
use in general – pursuant to Article 38 of the Single Convention and to the right 
to health89 – will have to be discouraged. Finally, the regulatory framework 
will need to comprise, among other things, a licensing system for cultivation, 
production, distribution and trade of cannabis, as well as an effective system 
of supervision and inspection of persons and organizations which are involved 
in the cultivation, distribution and trade. This regulatory framework could well 
be designed along the lines of the UN narcotic drugs conventions’ system of 
estimates.90 Considering the importance of the principle of systemic integra-
tion in international law, all four points could and should be implemented and 
secured in an inter se agreement. 
4.1.4 Inter se Modification in Order to Formalize the Correct Position of 
Human Rights in the UN Drugs Control System
Article 14(2) of the Illicit Traffic Convention confirms that the measures ad-
opted to prevent illicit cultivation and eradication of cannabis plants “shall 
respect fundamental human rights”, and the incb holds more generally that 
“Drug control action must be consistent with international human rights 
standards”.91 Still, the “relationship between drug control and human rights and 
88   The following is based on the analysis in sections 3.10.3 and 3.12 in Van Kempen & 
Fedorova (2018 ii), supra note 11.
89   See supra note 27.
90   See Articles 12–21bis Single Convention. See also Commentary Single Convention, supra 
note 8, p. 263 (no 1) and also p. 155 (no 1–2) and p. 221 (no 1). 
91   incb Report 2015, p. 6 (no 36); see further supra note 63.
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the implications of that relationship for national responses to the world 
drug problem”92 is by no means sufficiently addressed in the UN narcotic drugs 
conventions nor in the jurisprudence of the incb. Inter se modification of 
these conventions could play a significant role in that regard. An inter se agree-
ment could codify the relationship between international human rights law 
and the UN narcotic drug control system, in which human rights obligations 
have priority over drug treaty obligations. It would furthermore strengthen the 
international system of human rights protection, for it would emphasize 
the various ways in which both negative and positive human rights obligations 
are of crucial importance to the drug control system. Moreover, an inter se 
agreement could confirm the state’s primary responsibility for implementing 
their international obligations in a manner that best fits the circumstances in 
that state’s jurisdiction.93 This can apply to their obligations under both the 
drugs conventions and human rights instruments.
4.2 The Potential Value of the Positive Obligations Approach for inter se 
Modification
The recognition of inter se agreements under international law provides states 
with an instrument to modify treaties to which they are a party, though only 
to some extent. An inter se agreement on cannabis regulation would clearly 
amount to contra legem modification, i.e. would constitute the reversal of obli-
gations under the UN narcotic drugs conventions.94 A crucial question is then 
whether such an inter se agreement could meet the conditions of Article 41(1)(b) 
of the vclt. This means that the agreement must not affect the other parties 
in their rights and obligations under the treaty nor is it allowed to be incom-
patible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty 
as a whole. As we will address below, there are in fact some issues with meet-
ing those conditions, all of which could be overcome through positive human 
rights obligations. We assert that the position that an inter se agreement on 
cannabis regulation is permissible under international law can be defended 
most solidly if states genuinely and convincingly argue that such regulation 
more effectively serves the interests of health and safety of individuals and the 
prevention of crime according to their positive human rights obligations. Since 
human rights obligations have priority over obligations under the drugs con-
ventions, states can in principle even effectuate that priority position without 
meeting the conditions of Article 41(1)(b) of the vclt. However, states should 
92   incb Report 2017, p. 44 (no 249).
93   See supra section 2.2.
94   See in the same fashion Boister & Jelsma, supra note 70, p. 461.
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rather strive to harmonize the interfering treaty regimes as much as possible 
through systemic integration.95 The positive human rights approach can give 
legitimacy, legality and substance to an inter se agreement on cannabis regula-
tion. That way, the agreement may be acceptable and even attractive to more 
drugs convention parties. As stated above, this approach protects legal certain-
ty, the authority and the binding force of international law.96
4.2.1 The Overall Effective Execution of the Object and Purpose of the 
UN Narcotic Drugs Conventions
Determining the object and purpose of a treaty is not an exact science. 
Moreover, relative to probably every treaty it is possible to find arguments 
against any object and purpose determination one could come up with. This 
is because treaties are the result of compromise, contain multi-interpretable 
terms and often include differentiations, exceptions or systemic inconsisten-
cies that may or may not be intended. Indeed, this also applies to the UN nar-
cotic drug conventions.97 However, what clearly does belong to the object and 
purpose of these conventions is the complete ban on circulation of narcotic 
drugs for non-medical and non-scientific use, considering98 the preambles, the 
text of the articles, the multi-layered framework of obligations, the system of 
international cooperation, and the preparatory work of the Single Convention 
and the Illicit Traffic Convention. It seems that this applies a fortiori to narcotic 
drugs that are derived from the cannabis plant, the coca bush or the opium 
poppy, since these are expressly and more specifically regulated in these con-
ventions. Cannabis (resin) is also included in both Schedule I and Schedule IV 
of the Single Convention. That means that the narcotic drug cannabis comes 
under the strictest regime the Convention provides for. The objective of this 
classification was to encourage states to apply the strictest control measures to 
cannabis.99 As a result, it would be difficult to argue that a reservation under 
drug conventions that were to allow the state to legalize recreational cannabis 
95   See supra section 4.1.1.
96   See supra section 4.1.2.
97   See several examples in Boister & Jelsma, supra note 70, p. 470 who even go so far as to 
speak of the “uncertain status of cannabis” in the Single Convention.
98   In conformity with Article 31 vclt and Guideline 3.1.5.1 of the ilc Guide to Practice on 
Reservations to Treaties (included in ilc, “Report 63rd Session”, A/66/10/Add.1, 2011); see 
also ilc, Tenth report on reservations to treaties by Mr. Alain Pellet, Special Rapporteur 
(A/CN.4/558 and Add.1–2, 2005) para 81, with references to icj case law.
99   See David R. Bewley-Taylor & Martin Jelsma, “Regime change: Re-visiting the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs”, 23 International Journal of Drug Policy (2012) pp. 72–81 at 
76 and 77.
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would not be “incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty” accord-
ing to Article 19 first sentence and under (c) vclt.100
However, a key question is whether this also excludes the possibility of an 
inter se agreement on cannabis regulation. That is not necessarily the case 
since under the Vienna Convention, the conditions for inter se agreements are 
less stringent than they are for reservations. There is a logic to this. Whereas 
a reservation has significance for all other states parties to the treaty whether 
they appreciate it or not, an inter se agreement only applies between the states 
parties that are in favour of it.101 According to Article 41(1)(b)(ii) of the vclt, 
inter se modification may not relate to a provision, derogation from which is 
incompatible with “the effective execution of the object and purpose of the 
treaty as a whole”.102 This implies a two-step test. First, it must be considered 
whether the inter se modification infringes on “the object and purpose of the 
treaty as a whole” (instead of being only contrary to subsidiary objectives that 
do not belong to the overall object and purpose). If this is not the case, the con-
dition of section (b)(ii) does not obstruct that modification. However, if – and 
only if – that interference with the “object and purpose” does occur, the second 
step of the test must still be taken. This means that it needs to be assessed 
whether the modification will also contravene “the effective execution” of the 
object and purpose of the treaty “as a whole” (thus, it must bear on the treaty’s 
overall effectiveness). The fact that Article 41(1)(b)(ii) requires this second step 
becomes particularly evident when one compares this provision with Article 
19(c) vclt, the text of which does not encompass such a requirement.
As for the first step: what is the object and purpose of the UN narcotic drug 
conventions “as a whole”? Is that only the health and welfare of mankind and 
of human beings,103 because each of the more concrete primary goals of the 
conventions (availability of narcotic drugs for medical and scientific use, and 
eradication of drugs for recreational purposes) applies only to parts of the con-
ventions? If that is the case, one could argue that an inter se agreement on can-
nabis regulation would be in conformity with Article 41(1)(b)(ii) of the vclt if 
such modification would serve the health and welfare of mankind at least as 
adequately as the drugs conventions do. To us it seems that this puts too much 
100   See also section 4.2.3 in Van Kempen & Fedorova (2018 i), supra note 9.
101   David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, “The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three 
Interpretive Methods”, 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 3 (2010) pp. 565–609 at 
575.
102   The wording and construction of the equally authentic French, Spanish and Russian texts 
is very much the same and does not give rise the different conclusions than we reach 
hereafter.
103   See supra section 1.
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weight on the “as a whole” clause. From a linguistic point of view, we find it 
hard to ascertain what the difference between the object and purpose of “the 
treaty” and of “the treaty as a whole” could be, since the phrase “the treaty” 
already implies that it is about the entirety of the treaty as one object. This 
approach also forces the “object and purpose” to be reduced to an abstraction 
with little specificity. Indeed, the “health and welfare of mankind” can be seen 
as the overall purpose of many treaties. There is also little evidence that “object 
and purpose” in Article 41 vclt is intended to have a meaning significantly 
different from that in Article 19 (reservations) and Article 31 (interpretation) 
for example.104 So we assert that an inter se agreement on cannabis regulation 
would interfere with a primary aspect of the object and purpose as a whole. 
Yet, there is still the second step of the test, for which the “as a whole” clause 
is of much more significance in our view. The mere fact that a modification 
interferes with an objective that belongs to the object and purpose of the 
treaty as a whole does not by itself mean that that interference also obstructs 
the effective execution as a whole. For the following reasons it is not obvious 
that an inter se agreement on cannabis regulation would actually – not just 
in theory – jeopardize the conventions’ overall effective execution, i.e. would 
undermine the drugs control system as such. Such agreement would first of all 
only modify treaty obligations as regards cannabis and not involve all other 
substances. Moreover, even for cannabis the treaty obligations will not be done 
away with since, these can remain applicable for illegal cannabis, i.e. cannabis 
cultivation and trade taking place outside of the regulatory framework of the 
legalization. The constriction that the effective execution must be viewed “as 
a whole” furthermore seems to suggest that the strengthening of the effective 
execution of other convention goals by that same modification can counter-
balance the weakening through inter se modification of the effective execution 
of the conventions relative to cannabis. If that is the case, it would be relevant 
when states parties to the inter se agreement could validly claim that they are 
actually better placed to discourage the use of drugs and to fight crime relative 
to other more harmful drugs effectively, for instance because regulated can-
nabis legalization will divide the different drugs markets. Meanwhile, it is of 
importance to note that the overall effective execution is also protected 
under the condition that inter se modification must not affect the other par-
ties in their rights and obligations under the treaty (Article 41(1)(b)(i) vclt). 
104   Cf., e.g., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, icj 28 May 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 15–30 at 21; ilc Guide to Practice on 
Reservations to Treaties and commentaries, supra note 98, p. 410 (no 4).
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Taking into consideration105 also that the obligations under the UN narcotic 
drugs conventions neither enjoy erga omnes status nor qualify as ‘integral 
obligations’,106 we find that it can be argued that an inter se agreement on can-
nabis regulation is possible within the limitations of Article 41(1)(b)(ii) vclt. 
However, since much depends on the interpretation of the phrase “as a whole” 
it seems also possible – albeit less convincingly – to argue the opposite.
Therefore, if inter se modification with a view to allowing cannabis regula-
tion were to be considered contrary to Article 41(1)(b)(ii) vclt, the priority 
position of positive human rights obligations could legally validate and le-
gitimize states to conclude such an inter se agreement anyway. The positive 
human rights approach would in addition offer a legal fundament to inter se 
modification that aims to result in a drug control system that more generally 
secures the interests in individual and public health, the safety of individuals’ 
environment and crime prevention, while leaving more latitude to states to 
decide how to realize this in the best possible way relative to cannabis. We 
emphasize that positive human rights obligations as such neither demand nor 
oppose cannabis regulation; they just require a policy that serves these inter-
ests best. Positive human rights obligations encompass a framework for that, 
by imposing five primary conditions on regulated legalization.107 These can 
help prevent states from unnecessarily or even unlawfully disregarding their 
obligations under the UN narcotic drugs conventions. That framework can 
serve as a blueprint for an inter se agreement, thereby offering states the op-
portunity to assess how to achieve the best implementation of their positive 
human rights obligations concerning the aforementioned interest, whether it 
is through regulation or prohibition of cannabis. Actually, all of this equally ap-
plies if one considered that cannabis regulation on the contrary is reconcilable 
with Article 41(1)(b)(ii) vclt. In that case, the positive human rights approach 
would still offer legality, legitimacy and a substantive framework to the agree-
ment. Recalibration of the “object and purpose” of the drug control system in 
the light of human rights obligations would moreover help to achieve harmo-
nization between cannabis regulation and the remaining opposing obligations 
under the drugs conventions.
105   See K. Odendahl, “Article 41”, in Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds.), Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, A Commentary (2012) pp. 719–727 at 725; Anne Rigaux 
& Denys Simon, ‘Article 41. Agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain 
of the parties only”, in O. Corsten & P. Klein (eds), The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties: A Commentary, Volume I (2011), pp. 986–1008 at 1003–1005 (para 35–39).
106   See para 3.7.9.xii in Van Kempen & Fedorova (2018 ii), supra note 11; see also Boister & 
Jelsma, supra note 70, pp. 475–482.
107   See supra section 2.3.
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4.2.2 Unfavourable Effects on the Rights or Obligations of Other States 
Parties
The condition under Article 41(1)(b)(i) vclt that inter se modification must 
not prejudice the other states parties’ rights or add to their burdens108 large-
ly overlaps with the human rights requirement that legalization of cannabis 
by a state may not have negative consequences for other states.109 The main 
concern in this regard will be that “lack of control or defective control in 
one country or territory appears to endanger the effectiveness of control in 
another country or territory”, as the Commentary to the Single Convention 
holds.110 An inter se agreement on cannabis regulation will always have to 
secure, on account of both the UN narcotic drugs conventions and human 
rights obligations, that states parties to the agreement guarantee a closed sys-
tem and/or chain for cultivation, trade and possibly also use of cannabis in the 
sense that cannabis cannot leak away to illegal markets abroad. This will more 
indirectly mean that illegal cannabis cultivation and trade (that is thus outside 
the regulatory framework) must continue to be combated in accordance with 
the conventions. It actually follows directly from Article 41(1)(b)(i) vclt that 
this is necessary in case of international illegal trafficking.
Then there are obligations under the UN narcotic drug conventions that 
are not backed up by human rights obligations but still need to be complied 
with on behalf of Article 41(1)(b)(i) vclt. For example, all states to the inter se 
agreement will have to fully honour their obligations to the parties to the 
drugs conventions – especially to all non-parties to the agreement – to afford 
mutual assistance and co-operate in order to prevent and combat interna-
tional illegal trafficking.111 This should not be a problem. It is nonetheless the 
question whether this is also the case relative to the obligation in Article 4(c) of 
the Single Convention to “co-operate with other States in the execution of the 
provisions of this Convention”. The provision is put in rather general terms and 
could therefore also be read as an obligation to cooperate where drugs traffick-
ing does not at all have an international aspect. The same lack of specificity is 
present in, for instance, Article 35(b) and (c) as well as in the Preamble to the 
Single Convention, which states that “universal action calls for international 
co-operation”. 
108   ilc, “Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries”, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission (1966, vol. ii) p. 235 (para 2).
109   See supra section 2.3.
110   Commentary Single Convention, supra note 8, p. 178 (no 1).
111   See, e.g. Article 35(e) Single Convention and throughout the Illicit Traffic Convention, the 
purpose of which, according to Article 2(1) is to promote co-operation relative to illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs with “an international dimension”.
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However, the Commentary to these Articles discusses their meaning in 
relation to international trafficking exclusively.112 Furthermore, the Single 
Convention and the Illicit Traffic Convention do not contain any provisions 
that are expressly about cooperation or assistance regarding trafficking of a 
solely national dimension. Finally, relative to the procedure of Article 14 of the 
Single Convention (concerning measures by the incb to ensure the execution 
of provisions of the Convention), the Commentary states that the Board will 
hardly be in a position to apply the procedure if “failure to comply with the 
treaty provisions has only a domestic impact”.113 This too underscores that traf-
ficking that remains national does not interfere with rights or obligations of 
other states parties. 
Furthermore, it will have to be presumed that Article 41(1)(b)(i) vclt only 
intends to frustrate inter se modification if the unfavourable effects on the 
rights or obligations of other parties are actual and not just theoretical and 
have a certain degree of intensity.114 Therefore, we very much doubt that it 
would suffice to argue, for example, that an inter se agreement on cannabis 
regulation affects rights because it broadcasts a message that is not in line 
with the message of non-acceptance of cannabis that states through the drugs 
conventions have agreed to signal universally. This is even more doubtful 
since the requirement of substantial actual effect also implies that non-parties 
to the inter se agreement that assert that their rights and obligations are 
actually affected by it have to substantiate that claim. The burden of proof is 
on the state that asserts a fact, whether claimant or respondent, as this is a 
well-established rule in both national and international law.115 Less obvious 
in our view is that Article 41(1)(b)(i) vclt does not apply if states parties were 
to claim that inter se modification will bear on the working of the estimate 
system in the Single Convention and will affect their rights therein as it will 
force them to revisit their position.116 They will either have to allow that the 
system shall henceforth include cannabis that is within the regulatory frame-
work or they will have to tolerate that the system can no longer be accurate on 
112   Commentary Single Convention, supra note 8, pp. 109–110 (nos 6–8) and 419–421 
(nos 1–8).
113   Commentary Single Convention, supra note 8, p. 178 (no 1).
114   Cf. the practice on Article 34 vclt (“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights 
for a third State without its consent.”), as is described in e.g. A. Proelss, “Article 34”, in 
Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds.), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
A Commentary (2012) pp. 605–654 at 612–619. 
115   See e.g. Mojtaba Kazazi, Burden of Proof and Related Issues: A Study on Evidence Before 
International Tribunals (1996) pp. 116–117.
116   Boister & Jelsma, supra note 70, pp. 462–463.
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cannabis that is legally in circulation within certain jurisdictions. Even so the 
question remains, however, whether this could qualify as a sufficiently intense 
effect on their rights.
Anyhow, again the positive human rights approach is of specific value if 
non-parties to the inter se agreement could argue with some justification that 
the agreement affects rights and obligations that are solely based on the UN 
narcotic drugs conventions. In as far as the violation of Article 41(1)(b)(i) vclt 
results from the implementation of positive human rights obligations through 
the inter se modification, the priority position of these obligations over the ob-
ligations in the drugs conventions can legally validate and legitimize the agree-
ment. Moreover, here too the human rights framework can be used to attain 
systematic integration of the regulated legalization of cannabis into the UN 
drugs control system. For example, the human rights obligation to discourage 
the use, production and marketing of narcotic drugs – and thus cannabis – can 
help to curtail negative effects for other states parties.117
5 Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the UN narcotic drugs conventions, international public law 
leaves states room – within limits – for regulated legalization of the cultiva-
tion of and trade in cannabis for recreational use. If a state genuinely believes 
and convincingly argues that with cannabis regulation positive human rights 
obligations that concern individual and public health, safety and crime con-
trol can be more effectively realized than under a prohibitive approach, the 
priority position of human rights obligations over the drugs conventions can 
justify such regulation. Apart from this it seems well arguable that in order to 
allow cannabis regulation within national jurisdictions, the UN narcotic drugs 
conventions can be modified between certain of the states parties only within 
the conditions of Article 41 of the vclt. This is possible by conclusion of an 
inter se agreement on cannabis regulation between states parties that are of 
the opinion that states must be given the possibility to legalize cannabis. The 
positive human rights approach and the inter se possibility can strengthen 
each other and seem to be a supreme combination. Because of their prior-
ity position, positive human rights obligations can further legally validate and 
legitimize an inter se agreement on cannabis regulation. Human rights fur-
thermore offer a substantive framework for the content of such agreement, 
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for example by requiring that states discourage use, production and marketing 
of cannabis. Simultaneously, an inter se agreement that is based on and stays 
within the positive human rights framework would be of significant help in 
granting human rights a place at the core of the drugs control system. Then the 
system can really advance the health and welfare of mankind and of human 
beings, which is the primary objective of the UN narcotic drugs conventions.
